Education's Selfish and Social Returns



My forthcoming book, The Case Against Education, devotes Chapter 5 to education's selfish returns (more commonly known as "private returns") and Chapter 6 to education's social returns.

This is where I show my work.

For now, I only show the main results: selfish returns for my four ideal types (Excellent, Good, Fair, and Poor Students), as well as social returns given my two main signaling scenarios.

Scenario #1 is Conservative Signaling, which assumes that sheepskin effects are signaling and all other effects are human capital.

Scenario #2 is Reasonable Signaling, which assumes that 80% of education's effects are signaling and the rest is human capital.

Please email me comments, questions, and especially corrections.

Note: Earlier versions of Excel may have a file conversion issue that prevents them from calculating negative rates of return. If any reported returns appear as "#NUM," you are experiencing this issue. Please contact me for the remedy.

Background Files

Selfish Return Files

Social Return with Conservative Signaling Files

Social Return with Reasonable Signaling Files